199 search results - page 32 / 40 » Auctions with Untrustworthy Bidders |
177
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CORR
2010
Springer
15 years 6 months ago
2010
Springer
We consider the problem of designing truthful auctions, when the bidders' valuations have a public and a private component. In particular, we consider combinatorial auctions w...
163
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SIGECOM
2009
ACM
16 years 1 months ago
2009
ACM
We analyze the problem of designing a truthful pay-per-click auction where the click-through-rates (CTR) of the bidders are unknown to the auction. Such an auction faces the class...
185
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COCOON
2005
Springer
16 years 5 days ago
2005
Springer
Abstract. We study the interval subset sum problem (ISSP), a generalization of the classic subset-sum problem, where given a set of intervals, the goal is to choose a set of intege...
146
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ATAL
2010
Springer
15 years 7 months ago
2010
Springer
This paper analyzes the worst-case efficiency ratio of falsename-proof combinatorial auction mechanisms. False-nameproofness generalizes strategy-proofness by assuming that a bidd...
165
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IJCAI
2001
15 years 8 months ago
2001
Market mechanisms play a central role in AI as a coordination tool in multiagent systems and as an application area for algorithm design. Mechanisms where buyers are directly clea...