Coalition formation is an important capability for automated negotiation among self-interested agents. In order for coalitions to be stable, a key question that must be answered i...
Naoki Ohta, Vincent Conitzer, Yasufumi Satoh, Atsu...
We present mechanisms, architectures, and an implementation addressing challenges with mobile opportunistic commerce centering on markets and mechanisms that support the procureme...
Many important problems in multiagent systems can be seen as resource allocation problems. For such problems, the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is efficient, in...
In many multiagent settings, each agent's goal is to come out ahead of the other agents on some metric, such as the currency obtained by the agent. In such settings, it is no...
We consider a multiagent resource allocation domain where the marginal production of each resource is diminishing. A set of identical, self-interested agents requires access to sh...