Abstract. The virtual laboratory (VILAB) supports interactive problem solving in computer science with access to complex software-tools. During the problem solving processes the le...
Abstract. This paper reports on the design of an auction mechanism for allocating multiple goods when the buyers have interdependent valuations. We cast the problem as a multi-agen...
Rajdeep K. Dash, Alex Rogers, Nicholas R. Jennings
Abstract. Current auctions often expose bidding agents to two difficult, yet common, problems. First, bidding agents often have the opportunity to participate in successive auctio...
Abstract. We provide a formal scripting language to capture the semantics of market mechanisms. The language is based on a set of welldefined principles, and is designed to captur...
In this paper we describe an analysis of two double auction markets— the clearing house auction and the continuous double auction. The complexity of these institutions is such th...