191
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AMEC
2004
Springer
16 years 13 days ago
2004
Springer
Abstract. In many settings, bidding agents for auctions do not know their preferences a priori. Instead, they must actively determine them through deliberation (e.g., information p...
189
Voted
SIGECOM
2004
ACM
16 years 14 days ago
2004
ACM
In many market settings, agents do not know their preferences a priori. Instead, they may have to solve computationally complex optimization problems, query databases, or perform ...
192
Voted
ATAL
2005
Springer
16 years 17 days ago
2005
Springer
The central mechanism design problem is to develop incentives for agents to truthfully reveal their preferences over different outcomes, so that the system-wide outcome chosen by ...